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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission1 opened the door to more political speech by
* Copyright Roger Colinvaux. Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The
Catholic University of America; Legislation Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation,
2001-2008. The author extends thanks to Harvey Dale and Jill Manny for the invita-
tion to write the paper for the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law’s Annual
Conference, Social Welfare Organizations: Better Alternatives to Charities?, October
26-27, 2017; Kenneth A. Gross and Trevor Potter for their insightful commentary; the
many conference participants; and Breck Story for research assistance.
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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nonprofit organizations. By removing the longstanding limit on the
ability to make independent expenditures for or against candidates, the
Supreme Court in effect invited nonprofits to participate more, and in
new ways, in partisan politics.
The political organization and the social welfare organization are
the most obliging forms for nonprofit political speech. The political
organization, as its name suggests, is the natural place for partisan
muckraking. As such, it has long attracted the attention of federal reg-
ulators and is subject to campaign finance-related disclosure rules.
The social welfare organization, on the other hand, may not be mostly
political, and so has avoided campaign finance-related regulation at
the federal level.2 Yet the open-ended nature of a social welfare pur-
pose can be used to accommodate a great deal of political activity.
Thus, after Citizens United, the social welfare organization became
attractive as an essentially unregulated vehicle for partisan speech.
The results have been catastrophic. As new groups form, some
with political ends, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) must decide
a basic question: whether an organization’s main purpose is political.
Rules written for a different era have failed miserably in the post-
Citizens United regulatory environment. Attempting to apply the
rules, the IRS dithered in granting exemptions, and opened itself up to
charges that it unfairly targeted nonprofit groups based on their politi-
cal views.3 The sensational claims have proved impossible to set
aside. As a result, the IRS budget has been slashed,4 the IRS Commis-
2. This Article does not discuss state law solutions to regulating the political cam-
paign activity of social welfare organizations. For that discussion, see Linda Sugin,
Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501(c)(4) Organizations, 91 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 895 (2016).
3. See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb & Karen Tumulty, IRS Admits Targeting Con-
servatives for Tax Scrutiny in 2012 Election, WASH. POST (May 10, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/irs-admits-targeting-conservatives-for-
tax-scrutiny-in-2012-election/2013/05/10/3b6a0ada-b987-11e2-92f3-f291801936b8_
story.html?utm_term=.e52c09b07eae; see also Peter Overby, IRS Apologizes For Ag-
gressive Scrutiny Of Conservative Groups, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2017, 3:08
PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/27/560308997/irs-apologizes-for-aggressive-scruti
ny-of-conservative-groups; Alan Rappeport, In Vetting Political Groups, I.R.S.
Crossed Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), at A23, https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/05/us/politics/irs-targeting-tea-party-liberals-democrats.html.
4. Joe Davidson, IRS Chief Departs, Blasting Congress for Budget Cuts Threating
Tax Agency, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/wp/2017/11/07/irs-chief-departs-blasting-congress-for-budget-cuts-threat
ening-tax-agency/?utm_term=.9c8b39c4c4bd (“[Commissioner] Koskinen had repeat-
edly warned Congress about the dangers of shortchanging the agency . . . . But Repub-
licans were intent on penalizing the IRS because they said it had improperly
scrutinized right-leaning organizations.”); see, e.g., BRANDON DEBOT, EMILY HORTON
& CHUCK MARR, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, TRUMP BUDGET CONTINUES
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 77 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 77 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\21-2\NYL205.txt unknown Seq: 3 27-MAR-19 15:08
2018] ENDING THE PLAGUE OF INCONSISTENCY 483
sioner has faced down impeachment charges,5 and the tax exemption
system and the rule of law are showing signs of strain.6 Making a bad
situation worse, Congress has ordered the IRS not to act,7 leaving a
festering situation to fester.
This Article considers the use of social welfare organizations for
political purposes, assesses the damage, and offers solutions.8 Part I of
the Article provides an overview of present law and compares social
welfare and political organizations in the context of political campaign
intervention. Part II considers the many serious ongoing harms that
MULTI-YEAR ASSAULT ON IRS FUNDING DESPITE MNUCHIN’S CALL FOR MORE RE-
SOURCES 2 (last updated Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/at
oms/files/3-14-17bud.pdf.
5. Andy Kroll, How the IRS Chief Went from Respectful Public Servant to Politi-
cal Punching Bag, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/life
style/magazine/how-the-irs-chief-went-from-respected-public-servant-to-political-
punching-bag/2017/02/28/d8b4673e-d1f4-11e6-945a-76f69a399dd5_story.html?utm_
term=.dc27ffcd610b; see also Susan Davis, House Republicans Divided over Im-
peachment of IRS Commissioner, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 8, 2016, 4:37 PM), https://
www.npr.org/2016/09/08/493157987/house-republicans-divided-over-impeachment-
of-irs-commissioner; Deirdre Walsh, Ted Barrett & Manu Raju, Move to Impeach IRS
Boss Fails, Spotlights GOP Split, CNN: POLITICS (Dec. 6, 2016, 7:44 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2016/12/06/politics/house-freedom-caucus-irs-commissioner-john-kos
kinen-impeach/index.html.
6. See Sugin, supra note 3, at 900 (explaining that “[t]he Tea Party scandal illumi-
nated the problem that had been long ignored in the § 501(c)(4) regulations. The stan-
dard was too vague”); see also ERIKA K. LUNDER & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40183, 501(c)(4)s AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS UNDER
TAX AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 5-6 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40183
.pdf (outlining three difficulties in defining how much campaign activity a social wel-
fare group may engage in); Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Fallout from Allegations of Tea
Party Targeting Hamper IRS Oversight of Nonprofits, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/fallout-from-allegations-of-tea-party-
targeting-hamper-irs-oversight-of-nonprofits/2017/12/17/6403c1c0-c59e-11e7-a4413a
768c8586f1_story.html?utm_term=.e3e192ed82f6 (“Tim Delaney, president and chief
executive of the National Council of Nonprofits, said his 25,000 members rely on
federal regulators to look out for abusive practices and maintain the public’s trust in
nonprofits. Many of them worry about the weakening of the [IRS Exempt Organiza-
tions] division.”).
7. Press Release, House Appropriations Comm., Appropriations Committee Re-
leases Fiscal Year 2018 Financial Services Bill (Jun. 28, 2017), https://appropriations
.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=394953 (explaining that the bill
provides for “[a] prohibition on a proposed regulation related to political activities and
the tax-exempt status of 501(c)(4) organizations”); see also Michael Wyland,
Whatever Happened to the IRS Tax Exemption Scandal?, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 22,
2017), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2017/08/22/whatever-happened-irs-tax-exemp
tion-scandal/ (providing a brief synopsis of some legislative proposals to prohibit the
IRS from regulating § 501(c)(4) organizations).
8. This Article focuses on social welfare (or “§ 501(c)(4)”) organizations. The is-
sues discussed, however, are similar for many other § 501(c) organizations, especially
labor unions and trade associations (organized under §§ 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) of the
Internal Revenue Code, respectively).
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have resulted from the current legal framework. Part III assesses dif-
ferent solutions. The Article concludes that in general, the disclosure
and financing rules concerning the political activity of social welfare
and political organizations should be consistent. Consistent rules
would reduce incentives to deceive regulators and the public and help
restore some integrity to the tax exemption system. Consistent rules
would also pave the way to eliminate existing limits on political activ-
ity by social welfare organizations and reduce the role of the IRS in
regulating speech.
I.
CHOOSING BETWEEN §§ 501(C)(4) AND 527 FOR
POLITICAL PURPOSES
Social welfare organizations, described under § 501(c)(4) of the
U.S. Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), are now established vehi-
cles for political campaign intervention. According to the Center for
Responsive Politics, in the 2016 election cycle, § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions spent more than $145 million on campaigns.9 For perspective,
this is about 60% of the amount spent by the political parties.10 The
electoral relevance of § 501(c)(4) organizations is likely to continue.
Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton, and Donald Trump have at least one
thing in common—each is associated with a § 501(c)(4) organization
to advance particular political causes.11 Other notable politically ac-
tive § 501(c)(4) organizations include NRA Institution for Legislative
9. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Outside Spending: 2016, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2016 (last visited
Jan. 29, 2019). This compares to over $118 million in 2014, Ctr. for Responsive Polit-
ics, Outside Spending: 2014, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2014 (last visited Jan. 29, 2019), and $257 million in
2012, Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Outside Spending: 2012, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2012 (last visited
Jan. 29, 2019).
10. Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Outside Spending: 2016, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2016 (last visited
Jan. 29, 2019). The percentage for 2014 is 49%, Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Outside
Spending: 2014, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes
_summ.php?cycle=2014 (last visited Jan. 29, 2019), and in 2012, § 501(c)(4) spend-
ing exceeded party spending, Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Outside Spending: 2012,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cy
cle=2012 (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
11. See Jonathan Karl & Benjamin Siegel, Bernie Sanders’ New Political Group
Raises Campaign Finance Questions, ABC NEWS (Aug 19, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://
abcnews.go.com/Politics/bernie-sanders-political-group-raises-campaign-finance-ques
tions/ story?id=41520854; see Niraj Chokshimay, Clinton Starts Anti-Trump Organi-
zation, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2017, at A14, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/us/
politics/hillary-clinton-onward-together.html; see TRUMP FOR AMERICA, http://www
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Action, 45 Cmte, America Future Fund, Americans for Prosperity, the
League of Conservation Voters, Majority Forward, the Environmental
Action Defense Fund, VoteVets, and other lesser spenders such as the
Planned Parenthood Action Fund.12
The rise of the political § 501(c)(4) organization is directly attrib-
utable to the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Commission.13 Before Citizens United, § 501(c)(4)
organizations were used for political purposes, but their use was rela-
tively limited. A main barrier was the campaign finance law rule that
barred corporations from making independent expenditures from gen-
eral corporate treasury funds to expressly advocate for or against can-
didates.14 Social welfare organizations could and did run hard-hitting
issue ads that had the effect of taking sides in a campaign, but with
express advocacy curtailed, the attractiveness of § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions was limited to a select type of speech that required legal nuance
for every communication.15 When the Supreme Court struck down the
limit on corporate independent expenditures, it opened the door for
social welfare organizations to be used more extensively and overtly
in political campaigns.
Nonetheless, the appeal of § 501(c)(4) for campaign intervention
remained tenuous still because of the uncertain application of the gift
tax to donors for their § 501(c)(4) contributions. The Code explicitly
provides a gift tax exemption for contributions to political organiza-
tions (organized under § 527 of the Code), and for charitable organi-
zations (under § 501(c)(3)), but provided no exemption for
§ 501(c)(4) contributions.16 Without a specific gift tax exemption, the
.trumptransitioncommittee.com/ (stating that it is an “organization established and
maintained under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code”).
12. For a complete list of the top nonprofit political spenders, see Ctr. For Respon-
sive Politics, Political Nonprofits: Top Election Spenders, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_elec.php?cycle=2016 (last visited Jan.
29, 2019); see generally FED. ELECTION COMM’N., INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE
TOTALS BY COMMITTEE AND FILER TYPE: JANUARY 1, 2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 31,
2016 (Apr. 7, 2017) (reporting total 2016 campaign expenditures reported by group
types to the FEC).
13. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
14. Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 amended § 441b
of the Federal Election Campaign Act to prohibit the use of corporate or union general
treasury funds for express advocacy. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.
§ 30118).
15. The Supreme Court carved out a limited exception for § 501(c)(4) campaign
activity in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986), by
holding that election law limits did not apply to a § 501(c)(4) organization “formed to
disseminate political ideas not to amass capital” and which did not accept corporate or
labor union contributions.
16. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(6) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 114-113 (2015)).
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presumption was that the gift tax applied.17 Thus, before Citizens
United, the possibility of a substantial tax on § 501(c)(4) contributions
was a significant additional deterrent to using § 501(c)(4) for political
purposes, even though the IRS historically had not enforced the gift
tax in the § 501(c)(4) context (whether for political or nonpolitical
contributions).18
After Citizens United relaxed the speech limits and made
§ 501(c)(4) more attractive in the political context, the IRS changed
course and began to enforce the gift tax.19 Congressional leaders
strongly disapproved,20 the IRS retreated,21 and eventually Congress
passed an explicit gift tax exemption for § 501(c)(4) gifts.22 Thus, by
2015, the two main barriers to using § 501(c)(4) organizations for the
serious conduct of political campaign activity had been removed.
One barrier nonetheless remained and remains: knowing the
amount of campaign activity that is consistent with status as a social
welfare organization. The law on this question is uncertain, and, since
Citizens United, controversial. The relevant provisions date to 1959
when the Treasury Department promulgated regulations for
§ 501(c)(4) organizations.
With respect to political activity, there are two key parts to the
regulation. First, the regulation flatly provides that campaign interven-
tion does not promote social welfare, making it by definition an unre-
17. See Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220 (ruling that “gratuitous transfers to per-
sons other than organizations described in section 527(e) of the Code are subject to
the gift tax absent any specific statute to the contrary, even though the transfers may
be motivated by a desire to advance the donor’s own social, political, or charitable
goals”).
18. For discussion of the many issues concerning the gift tax and political activity,
see generally Ellen P. Aprill, Once and Future Gift Taxation of Transfers to Section
501(c)(4) Organizations: Current Law, Constitutional Issues, and Policy Considera-
tions, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289 (2012).
19. Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Sets Sights on Donors’ Gifts That Push Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A1. Enforcement of the gift tax was one of the few bright
line regulatory levers the IRS had to deter the use of § 501(c)(4) for political
purposes.
20. Letter from Senator Orrin Hatch, to Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Reve-
nue Serv. (May 18, 2011), 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 97-31. (May 19, 2011).
21. Memorandum from Steven T. Miller, Deputy Comm’r for Servs. & Enf’t, Inter-
nal Revenue Serv. to Comm’r, Small Bus./Self-Employed Div. & Comm’r, Tax-Ex-
empt and Gov’t Entities Div. (July 8, 2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/
guidance_for_irs_sbse_estate_and_gift_tax_and_tege_exempt_organizations.pdf.
22. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 3120
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(6)). The gift tax exclusion also applies to
§ 501(c)(5) and § 501(c)(6) organizations.
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lated activity.23 Second, the regulations interpret the statute’s
requirement that a social welfare organization be organized and oper-
ated “exclusively for the promotion of social welfare” to mean that the
organization be “primarily engaged in promoting in some way the
common good and general welfare of the people of the community.”24
The IRS has construed this to mean that “the organization’s primary
activities [must] promote social welfare.”25 Taking both parts of the
regulation together, the result is that social welfare organizations may
engage in campaign activity, notwithstanding that it is singled out as
an unrelated activity, but only if the campaign activity (combined with
any other non-social welfare activities) does not constitute the primary
activity of the organization.
The difficulty then is determining when an unrelated activity be-
comes a primary one, i.e., in deciding how much of an activity is too
much. One informal standard is that a § 501(c)(4) organization will
not lose its exempt status so long as at least fifty-one percent of its
activities are in pursuit of social welfare.26 Some courts take a more
restrictive approach, concluding that unrelated activities must not be
“substantial.”27 Regardless of which standard is used, however, there
is no firm guidance as to whether the permitted amount of unrelated
activities should be assessed based on expenditures alone, or also on
qualitative factors such as the effort or the time spent by volunteers.28
23. The regulation provides: “The promotion of social welfare does not include
direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office . . . .” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-
1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
24. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (emphases added).
25. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
26. This has been referred to as a rule of thumb used by IRS agents in the field.
Lindsey McPherson, EO Training Materials Suggest 51 Percent Threshold for Social
Welfare Activity, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 13–15 (Jan. 21, 2014) (suggesting that the
Service staff calculate the meaning of primary as fifty-one percent of expenditures for
exempt activities).
27. See Vision Service Plan v. United States, No. CIVS041993LKKJFM, 2005 WL
3406321, at *5, *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005). For additional discussion, see Miriam
Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of
501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165, 168 (2006). The substantiality threshold
likely stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Better Business Bureau of Wash-
ington, D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
28. The IRS has described the test as a facts and circumstances determination. Fac-
tors include funds and time (including volunteer time) spent, other resources used, and
the manner in which the activities are conducted. See Raymond Chick & Amy
Henchey, Political Organizations and IRC 501(c)(4), EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR
1995, at 192 (1995). As Professor Aprill notes, “[a]dvisors differ widely in how much
politicking they believe § 501(c) organizations . . . can undertake without endangering
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Consequently, social welfare organizations that engage in political
campaign activity operate in a cloud.
That said, the legal uncertainty about how much campaign activ-
ity is allowed for social welfare organizations is longstanding, and un-
til recently, was not very important. For decades, the IRS,
policymakers, and the public lived with the uncertainty as one of
many imperfect areas in tax law and administration. The uncertainty
did not matter much because, for the most part, social welfare organi-
zations stayed out of politics and could be safely ignored.29 However,
once the campaign finance and gift tax barriers to using § 501(c)(4)
organizations for political purposes were removed, the “primarily” test
of tax law rose in prominence as the controlling limit on § 501(c)(4)
campaign activity. The result has been a fiasco.
Before considering the fiasco though, it must first be noted as to
why, even after Citizens United, anyone would seriously want to use
the § 501(c)(4) category for political reasons. In general, politically
motivated groups have a natural home in the tax code—i.e., § 527,
which governs political organizations. A political organization is de-
fined as an organization “organized and operated primarily for the
purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making ex-
penditures, or both, for an exempt function.”30 An exempt function is,
generally, political campaign activity.31 Thus, when the main purpose
of an organization is political, the tax classification follows that
purpose.
After Citizens United, a new organization contemplating political
campaign activity would weigh the pros and cons of the different tax
classifications: § 527 versus § 501(c)(4). In the key categories of in-
come tax exemption and the treatment of donors to the organization,
there is either no material difference, or the edge goes to the social
welfare organization.
First, the income tax treatment of the two organizations is
broadly similar. Political organizations are exempt on their (political)
their exempt status.” Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable
Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 382 (2011).
29. See Frank Bass, After Citizens United, a Surge in “Dark Money” Groups,
MAPLIGHT (May 12, 2016), https://maplight.org/story/after-citizens-united-a-surge-in-
dark-money-groups/.
30. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2012).
31. “The term ‘exempt function’ means the function of influencing or attempting to
influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any
Federal, State, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the elec-
tion of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors . . . .” I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 80 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 80 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\21-2\NYL205.txt unknown Seq: 9 27-MAR-19 15:08
2018] ENDING THE PLAGUE OF INCONSISTENCY 489
contribution income but pay tax on their investment income.32 At first
blush then, social welfare organizations appear to have a significant
advantage because their generic tax exemption covers not only contri-
butions but extends to investment income. However, if a social wel-
fare organization engages in political campaign activity, a tax is
imposed on the lesser of the organization’s net investment income or
political expenditures.33 In other words, politically active social wel-
fare organizations lose their exemption on investment income (up to
the amount of political expenditures).
Nonetheless, despite this broad parity in tax treatment, social
welfare organizations maintain an advantage over political organiza-
tions because the § 501(c)(4) exemption covers a wide range of activi-
ties, including lobbying.34 A political organization by contrast is
expected mostly to engage in politics and does not have an exemption
with respect to any nonpolitical activity.35 For example, if a political
organization wanted to engage in a charitable activity, nonpartisan
electoral activity, or even lobbying, the amounts spent on these activi-
ties would be subject to tax. Thus, for all practical purposes, § 527
works for and is intended for purely political organizations.36 A mixed
32. This tax treatment generally follows normative tax principles. The exemption
on contribution income is not intended as a subsidy but reflects the idea that political
organizations are a pooling of already taxed resources. See Daniel Halperin, Income
Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 134–35 (2006) (noting that the
exemption for political parties “may reflect the notion that . . . pooling resources does
not in itself result in income”); Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating
Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1015 (2005) (noting that
the nontaxation of contributions made to fund political activity reflects application of
“general tax principles”); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 (Mar. 19, 1990) (noting
that Congress had “essentially codified the conduit concept”). Congress also provided
in the legislative history to § 527 that “political activity (including the financing of
political activity) as such is not a trade or business which is appropriately subject to
tax.” S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7502 (1974). Investment income, however, is income
appropriately subject to tax (i.e., taxation of investment income is in line with the
neutrality, no-subsidy rationale, namely that political organizations do not provide a
public benefit that should be subsidized).
33. Congress imposed this tax to achieve parity in the tax treatment of political
campaign activity, meaning that organizations would not have an incentive to conduct
campaign activity outside of the political organization form in order to escape the tax
on investment income. The legislative history explained that noncharitable exempts
should be treated “on an equal basis for tax purposes with political organizations.” S.
REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7505 (1974).
34. Social welfare organizations lose exemption with respect to political activity
and unrelated trade or business activity.
35. I.R.C. § 527(c)(3). Congress codified the tax treatment of political organiza-
tions in 1975 to clarify the tax treatment of a known entity type—political parties and
political committees whose sole purpose was to elect or nominate candidates.
36. The exemption for political organizations extends beyond contribution income
to include income from bingo games and sale of campaign materials. Id.
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purpose organization or one contemplating a range of activities
(whether or not in furtherance of social welfare) is far better off under
§ 501(c)(4).
Section 501(c)(4) has other advantages over § 527, the most no-
torious of which relates to the disclosure of donors. In the year 2000,
Congress imposed a disclosure regime on political organizations, re-
quiring the public disclosure of donors who make more than $200 in
contributions.37 The rules mimic the disclosure rules that apply to po-
litical committees required to register with the Federal Election Com-
mission (“FEC”).38 Congress took this action in response to groups
that managed to escape FEC regulation (and so disclosure obligations)
but nonetheless were engaged in political activity and organized under
§ 527.39 Controversially, Congress used the tax law instead of the
campaign finance law as the basis for disclosure.40 Accordingly, since
the year 2000 political activity conducted through a § 501(c)(4) organ-
ization but not a § 527 organization may be done anonymously, mak-
ing § 501(c)(4) clearly preferable to § 527 for donors who want to
avoid disclosure.
Section 501(c)(4) organizations have yet another advantage over
§ 527 organizations, namely a significant tax benefit for donors who
finance their contributions with appreciated property. The Code pro-
vides that contributions of appreciated property to a § 527 organiza-
tion are a realization event for the donor, meaning that the donor must
pay tax on the capital gain.41 By contrast, the same property donated
to a § 501(c)(4) organization has no tax consequence for the donor.
Thus, a donor with highly appreciated property to donate for political
purposes would strongly prefer to transfer the asset to a § 501(c)(4)
37. Id. § 527(j)(3)(B).
38. See e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional
Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 646 n.103 (2007).
39. Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 To Design a New Campaign
Finance Vehicle, 26 TAX NOTES 387 (2000); see also Aprill, supra note 28, at 371. At
the time, the groups were referred to as “stealth PACs.”
40. As Professor Aprill has said, “the amendments to § 527 are campaign finance
laws in tax clothing.” Aprill, supra note 28, at 391. Professor Aprill has argued that
one reason Congress used the tax code for campaign finance disclosure was to protect
the disclosure requirements from constitutional challenge, i.e., by making disclosure a
constitutional condition of a tax “subsidy.” Id. at 400. She notes, however, that after
Citizens United upheld disclosure provisions under campaign finance law, reliance on
the taxing power may no longer be required. Id.; see also Polsky & Charles, supra
note 32, at 1022–24. The result has been to charge the IRS with the responsibility for
enforcing what is really campaign finance not tax law.
41. I.R.C. § 84.
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organization—not a § 527 organization—in order to avoid a tax on
the gain (especially since the gift tax no longer applies).42
To sum up, in comparing the § 501(c)(4) and § 527 tax classifi-
cations with respect to political activity, the income tax treatment for
each is broadly similar: exemption for contributions and taxation of
investment income. The main differences then lie elsewhere, with
§ 501(c)(4) offering clear advantages. Social welfare organizations
may engage in nonpolitical activities without tax penalty,43 and donors
to social welfare organizations may remain anonymous and avoid cap-
ital gains taxes on contributions of appreciated property.
All these advantages for social welfare groups must then be
weighed against the one advantage of the political organization: un-
limited political activity. Social welfare groups remain subject to the
political activity limit of the Treasury regulations, i.e., campaign inter-
vention may not be their primary activity. The question for putative
political groups (as well as existing social welfare organizations) then
becomes the true meaning of primary activity. The willingness to plan
around this test and push its boundaries and the enforcement capabili-
ties of the IRS becomes the locus for the choice between § 501(c)(4)
and § 527 status and resulted in the aforementioned fiasco.
It is far beyond the scope of this Article to assess the calamity
that resulted from the IRS’s efforts to administer the “primarily” stan-
dard (for which Congress bears significant blame),44 but some
description of the affair is necessary. The broad outlines are well
known. In a clumsy admission to tax lawyers, the head of exempt
organizations at the IRS apologized for using inappropriate audit se-
lection criteria and for delaying the applications for § 501(c)(4) status,
42. If the gift tax applied, however, the nontaxation of appreciated property gifts to
§ 501(c)(4) organizations likely would not be a reason to give to a § 501(c)(4) organi-
zation instead of a § 527 organization. Faced with a choice between paying gift tax on
the entire amount of the contribution (if made to a § 501(c)(4) entity) or capital gains
tax on the amount of appreciation (if made to a political organization), a donor would
opt for capital gains tax and donate to the § 527 entity.
43. There are two limitations here: unrelated trade or business activities are subject
to tax, and as noted above, the total amount of unrelated activities must be become
primary.
44. Congress’s decision to make the IRS responsible for administering campaign
finance disclosure rules and its push-back against IRS efforts to enforce the gift tax on
§ 501(c)(4) organizations are two of the main culprits.
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especially of “Tea Party” groups.45 This led to hysterical reactions and
accusations of political targeting by the IRS.46
Suffice it to say that although the IRS made poor decisions, be-
cause of the subject matter, the affair was blown out of all proportion
as a proxy for other political fights. Rather than fomenting outrage,
serious policymakers in Congress would have reprimanded the IRS
and then moved on to address the underlying problem, which, as out-
lined above, lies in the advantages to conducting political activity in
the § 501(c)(4) form relative to the political organization after Citizens
United.
Instead, Congress made a difficult situation worse. Through two
actions, Congress has effectively entrenched the uncertainty of the sta-
tus quo. First, by enacting a gift tax exclusion for contributions to
§ 501(c)(4) groups, and not at the same time extending disclosure
rules to § 501(c)(4) organizations, Congress in effect endorsed contin-
ued exploitation of § 501(c)(4) for political purposes.47 In other
words, a stand-alone gift tax exclusion sends the message that Con-
gress expects donors to fund political activity by § 501(c)(4) groups,
knowing full well the advantages § 501(c)(4) status brings over § 527
status. Second, Congress directed the IRS not to take any action to
clarify standards for campaign intervention under § 501(c)(4).48 This
has had the effect of freezing the cloud of uncertainty about how much
political activity is too much, all but telling the IRS not to attempt to
enforce the law in any meaningful way and encouraging groups to
take advantage of legal ambiguity and a cowed overseer.
45. See generally TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-10-053, INAP-
PROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-
VIEW (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr
.pdf.
46. See e.g., The IRS: Targeting Americans for Their Political Beliefs: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement
of Rep. Darrell Issa, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform). The saga
continues in a wide range of lawsuits. For additional discussion, see generally Evelyn
Brody & Marcus Owens, Exile to Main Street: The I.R.S.’s Diminished Role in Over-
seeing Tax-Exempt Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859 (2016).
47. This is not to suggest that the gift tax should apply to § 501(c)(4) organizations;
rather, through happenstance, the applicability of the gift tax was the only real barrier
(rightly or wrongly) to keeping political money from moving into § 501(c)(4).
48. Under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, the IRS may not use funds
to “issue, revise, or finalize any regulation, revenue ruling, or other guidance not
limited to a particular taxpayer relating to the standard which is used to determine
whether an organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare
for purposes of section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” Pub. L. No.
114-113, Div. E, tit. I, § 127(1), 129 Stat. 2242, 2433.
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With paralysis as the new normal, the question is whether it mat-
ters. Given the advantages of § 501(c)(4) over § 527, it is reasonable
to expect that § 501(c)(4) organizations will continue to be used in
political campaigns. Even so, social welfare organizations are still a
clear second choice for political spending by independent groups. For
example, in the 2016 election cycle, § 501(c)(4) spending was
dwarfed by the spending of superPACs.49 SuperPACs spent $1.06 bil-
lion while § 501(c)(4) organizations spent just 13.7% of that, at
$145.5 million.50 At a minimum, this suggests that the nondisclosure
of donors and beneficial financing offered by § 501(c)(4) are not
enough to outweigh the limit on their political activities, even with
limited IRS enforcement.
Further, in the wake of Citizens United, the fact that § 501(c)(4)
organizations increasingly are engaging in politics is consistent with
the free speech policy behind that decision. Under Citizens United,
free speech is furthered when corporations of all stripes exercise their
now protected constitutional rights to engage in independent expendi-
tures. Thus, to the extent that social welfare organizations were re-
strained before the decision, that restraint has now been lifted and
social welfare groups are, to some degree, just exercising their newly
found constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, the uncertainty of the sta-
tus quo is neither desirable nor sustainable, as the next part of the
article explores.
II.
SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS FROM INCONSISTENT RULES
It has been said that inconsistency is the hobgoblin of little
minds. Perhaps this is true when the pursuit of consistency undoes
rational but inconsistent rules. In the context of political activity, how-
ever, the inconsistent treatment of political speech across tax exemp-
tion categories does not make sense and indeed is itself the problem.
The preferences given to political speech by social welfare organiza-
tions—nondisclosure and (to a lesser extent) preferred financing—are
causing significant harms to the tax system and the rule of law that are
bound to get worse with each election cycle. In a nutshell, the incon-
49. SuperPACs are § 527 organizations also unleashed by Citizens United.
50. See Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Outside Spending: Totals by Type of Spender,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cy
cle=2016 (last visited Jan. 29, 2019). That said, the percentage of § 501(c)(4) spend-
ing as a percentage of super PAC spending for the past two election cycles was con-
siderably higher, at 34.5% in 2014, and 42.2% in 2012.
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 82 Side B      03/27/2019   15:29:06
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 82 Side B      03/27/2019   15:29:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\21-2\NYL205.txt unknown Seq: 14 27-MAR-19 15:08
494 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21:481
sistency drives opportunistic behavior, creates political tension be-
tween the IRS and Congress, and leads to many negative ripple effects
throughout the regulatory system. The harms take multiple forms and
are surveyed below.
A main harm results from the fact that § 501(c)(4) has become a
home for anonymous speech. Ever since the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974,51 a norm of campaign finance law,
albeit a debated one, has been to require disclosure of the sources of
political contributions.52 The desire of some to avoid disclosure has
led to the sourcing of political speech through alternative vehicles,
first stealth PACs and now social welfare groups. When political
speech occurs outside of the reach of disclosure rules, it is termed (by
disclosure advocates) as “dark money.”
The initial harm that comes from using social welfare organiza-
tions for dark money relates to the dark money problem more gener-
ally.53 Dark money in political campaigns has become a polarizing
issue.54 Its use is viewed by many as a blatant abuse of the campaign
finance system, as dishonest, and sometimes illegal. In a word, dark
money smacks of corruption. It evokes shadowy figures, backroom
deals, and smoke-filled rooms.55 Importantly, whether dark money ac-
tually corrupts is not the main issue. Rather it is the perception of
corruption that matters.
Thus, a significant (if hard to quantify) harm that comes from
using social welfare organizations for dark money is the corrosive ef-
fect on the tax exemption system that comes from being associated
with corruption. When “dark money” and “501(c)(4)” become synon-
ymous in the eyes of the public, one result is to tarnish the entire
social welfare population. Yet of the roughly 80,000 social welfare
organizations, most do not engage in political activity.56 Nevertheless,
51. Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
52. The Supreme Court has upheld disclosure rules on several occasions as advanc-
ing the public interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, in-
cluding in Citizens United. E.g., 558 U.S. at 371.
53. See generally JANE MEYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BIL-
LIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016).
54. Importantly, the term itself is polarizing. What is darkness to some is privacy to
others.
55. See Meyer, supra note 53, at 226-28.
56. The National Center for Charitable Statistics reports that in 2013 there were
82,197 social welfare organizations: Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United
States, 2003-2013, NCCS, http://nccs.urban.org/sites/all/nccs-archive/html/PubApps/
profile1.php?state=US (last visited Jan. 30, 2019); see also JEREMY KOULISH, FROM
CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS: THE HISTORY, ANATOMY, AND ACTIVITIES OF SECTION
501(C)(4) ORGANIZATIONS 6–7 (2016) (finding that advocacy occurs in less than one-
third of social welfare organizations, with advocacy defined to include lobbying and
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the negative impact affects the entire brand and has even led to calls to
abolish the category.57
Further, the taint is not limited to § 501(c)(4) organizations but
extends to charitable, or § 501(c)(3), organizations. For good reason,
public understanding of tax classifications is minimal at best. The im-
portant differences between a § 501(c)(3) charity and a § 501(c)(4)
social welfare group are known to a subset of tax lawyers and policy
experts, but for most people, it is easy to conflate the two types of
organization. This is especially true because “social welfare” is con-
sidered a charitable purpose and sounds charitable in nature. In addi-
tion, the common use of networked exempt organizations means that
affiliated § 501(c)(3), § 501(c)(4), and § 527 organizations often have
similar sounding names. Dark money in one is easy to attribute
(rightly or wrongly) to all. As a result, dark money becomes to some
degree attached to perceptions of all exempt organizations, undermin-
ing public trust.
Loss of trust in the nonprofit sector is an existential risk. The halo
effect—the notion that nonprofit institutions confer public benefits,
seek truth, are independent, and are even noble—is central to the over-
all success of the sector. The stronger the association of nonprofits and
dark money, and the related ugliness of partisanship and propaganda,
the weaker the entire sector becomes.
This weakness is amplified by a related erosion to the rule of law
in the tax exemption system. The lure of dark money (and preferred
financing) causes political actors to exploit vulnerabilities in the law
to the greatest degree. Legal standards in the exempt organization field
are notoriously vague, based on words like “primary” and “substan-
tial,” not to mention “charitable,” “social welfare,” “educational,”
“community,” and of course what it means to “participate” or “inter-
vene” in a political campaign. The system of tax classifications was
not drawn up to be a precise scientific taxonomy but has always re-
other activity that is not campaign activity). As discussed in Professor Aprill’s article
in this issue, there are different estimates of the number of § 501(c)(4) organizations,
but certainly they number in the tens of thousands. Ellen P. Aprill, Examining the
Landscape of § 501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 345, 360-63 (2018); see also Drew Dimmery & Andrew Peterson, Shining the
Light on Dark Money: Political Spending by Nonprofits, 2 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J.
SOC. SCI. 51 (2016) (detailing “politically adjusted revenue (PAR)—the part of non-
profits’ revenue that is devoted to political activity” and the growing importance of
nonprofits in political spending and campaign finance).
57. John D. Colombo, The IRS Should Eliminate 501(c)(4) Organizations, N.Y.
TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (May 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2013/05/15/does-the-irs-scandal-prove-that-501c4s-should-be-eliminated/the-irs-
should-eliminate-501c4-organizations.
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quired judgment by regulators, the good faith of private actors, and the
political support of Congress to work well. Dark money has put all
three to the test.
For instance, when a group begins with political aims, but wants
to keep donors anonymous, it is easy to form as a § 501(c)(4) social
welfare organization. A group need not be much more than a name
(e.g., “Citizens for Good”), a bank account, and officers to manage
and spend money. No physical office or activities, apart from the rais-
ing and spending of money, is necessary. For new groups, the IRS has
to make a judgment,58 based on statements of intent by the group’s
founders and an often-limited track record, as to whether the group
properly is a § 501(c)(4) organization or is in reality a political organi-
zation. Without strong support for this regulatory function from both
political parties in Congress, any categorical judgment by the IRS ex-
poses the agency to scrutiny and voluble criticism.
Further, the law the IRS uses to make judgments in this area is
weak. Unless the legal standards are changed,59 the IRS must make a
series of very difficult assessments, even when a group has an exten-
sive track record. Is a group’s activity political campaign activity, and
therefore limited? Or is the activity lobbying, issue advocacy, nonpar-
tisan activity, educational activity, or something else, and therefore
not limited (unless “unrelated”)? Groups intent on evading the politi-
cal activity characterization can plan the activity to be close to but not
clearly political activity, opening the door to ambiguity. In addition,
because political activity is based on the facts and circumstances, in
theory the IRS must make a separate assessment with respect to each
act or expenditure, which allows any determined group to exploit un-
certainties in the law and question the IRS’s decision repeatedly.60
58. The judgment would occur either when the group files an annual information
return (Form 990) or when the group applies for § 501(c)(4) status, if it does so.
59. As noted above, the IRS issued Proposed Regulations to change some of the
standards in this area, imposing bright lines that would deem certain activity (e.g.,
voter registration drives, advertisements made within a certain proximity to an elec-
tion) as political campaign activity. The regulations were widely criticized. Congress
subsequently intervened by forbidding the IRS from taking further steps to develop
the law in the area. See Katy O’Donnell, White House Surrenders on ‘Dark Money’
Regulation (Dec. 18, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/white-
house-dark-money-216956. Subsequently, in appropriations bills, Congress has for-
bidden the IRS from using funds for regulatory scrutiny of groups based on their
ideological beliefs, including as recently as a House-passed bill on September 14,
2017. Department of the Treasury Appropriations Act of 2018, H.R. 3354, 115th
Cong. Division D § 108 (as passed by House, Sept. 14, 2017).
60. Robert Maguire, How Crossroads GPS Beat the IRS and Became a Social Wel-
fare Group, OPENSECRETS BLOG (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2016/02/how-crossroads-gps-beat-the-irs-and-became-a-social-welfare-group/.
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 84 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 84 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\21-2\NYL205.txt unknown Seq: 17 27-MAR-19 15:08
2018] ENDING THE PLAGUE OF INCONSISTENCY 497
Moreover, even if there is agreement that an activity is political,
political activity is a permitted activity. The issue then becomes
whether the political activity in the aggregate has crowded out social
welfare activity as the primary activity of the organization. As noted,
though, the legal standard for what constitutes a “primary” activity is
another grey area, requiring more judgment by the agency and appli-
cation of unclear standards.
A further complicating factor is that, purely as a matter of col-
lecting the right amount of federal income tax from the organization, it
is of slight consequence whether an organization is classified as a
§ 501(c)(4) or a § 527.61 As a result, there is little revenue at stake in
properly assigning an exemption category to a group.62 Normally, the
absence of revenue concerns would allow the IRS to take a somewhat
lax enforcement approach. With respect to political activity, however,
because there is a disclosure consequence to tax classification, the IRS
cannot (or should not) ignore classification issues, and the flaws to the
system are magnified.
This leads to an erosion of the rule of law. Groups are embold-
ened to challenge the IRS. Some groups plainly are not concerned
about IRS enforcement, spending well over 50% of all expenses (in
some cases, near 100%) on what would appear to be political activ-
ity.63 Other groups might just game the system. For example, the
League of Women Voters reports that “creative political operatives
can leverage campaign expenditures by donating 50.1 percent of a
501(c)(4) organization’s receipts to an affiliated 501(c)(4) organiza-
tion in order to establish a social welfare primary purpose. The second
social welfare organization then has a larger contribution base on
which to determine its 49.9 percent maximum permitted campaign ex-
penditures.”64 Further, some groups could effectively rent out their
exemptions. For example, a large existing § 501(c)(4) organization
with an annual operating budget of, say, $5 million all in social wel-
61. Admittedly, this depends upon whether social welfare organizations have in-
vestment income and the IRS enforces the tax under § 527(f).
62. As noted, this does not apply to donors. See supra Part I.
63. Robert Maguire, Political Nonprofit Spent Nearly 100 Percent of Funds to Elect
Tillis in ’14, OPENSECRETS BLOG (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2015/10/political-nonprofit-spent-nearly-100-percent-of-funds-to-elect-tillis-in-14/;
Will Tucker, Two Dozen Dark Money Groups Have Busted 50 Percent Cap on Polit-
ics at Least Once (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2015/12/two-
dozen-dark-money-groups-have-busted-50-percent-cap-on-politics-at-least-once/.
64. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, MONEY IN POLITICS: INDEPENDENT EXPENDI-
TURES, LWV: MONEY IN POLITICS REVIEW 4 (July 20, 2015), http://forum.lwv.org/
sites/default/files/mip_independent_expenditures_final_.pdf (providing an overview
of “independent expenditures” and § 501(c)(4)’s deficient disclosure requirements).
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 84 Side B      03/27/2019   15:29:06
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 84 Side B      03/27/2019   15:29:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\21-2\NYL205.txt unknown Seq: 18 27-MAR-19 15:08
498 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21:481
fare activity could absorb up to $4,999,999 of contributions for politi-
cal ads arguably without risking exemption. Still other groups might
risk perjury through incorrect or false statements on the annual infor-
mation return, leading to erosion of the integrity of the reporting
regime.
Relatedly, social welfare organizations can be used to get around
other campaign finance related laws. Private foundations, for instance,
risk loss of tax exemption and an excise tax if they fund campaign
intervention.65 Private foundations nonetheless can provide the base
funding for the social welfare arm of a § 501(c)(4) organization. With
a (presumably) bona fide social welfare core activity thus established,
the § 501(c)(4) organization can then raise and spend almost as much
on political activity.66 In a similar vein, concern is mounting that fun-
neling money through § 501(c)(4) organizations provides a way for
foreign nationals to influence elections.67 The ability to move money
from organization to organization makes it more difficult to track by
requiring that the IRS follow the (fungible) money.
Not only does the current legal framework foster disregard for
the law, the rule of law also is damaged by the IRS’s apparent inabil-
ity to take effective enforcement action. As dark money washes
through the nonprofit world, voices opposed to undisclosed political
spending blame the IRS for not enforcing the tax-exemption laws.
This criticism, however, feeds a misperception that political activity is
tax-favored by exemption and that the IRS’s administrative impotence
enables tax cheats. But any IRS failure properly to characterize non-
profit groups supports a disclosure shelter, not a tax shelter. The root
of the problem is not vague exemption standards and uncertain politi-
cal activity definitions but inconsistent disclosure rules and Con-
65. I.R.C. § 4955 (2012).
66. As Professor Aprill explains: “[D]onors can set up a private foundation, getting
the charitable contribution deduction or donations to it, then donate funds earmarked
for charitable activities from the private foundation to a § 501(c)(4) organization. The
private foundation undertakes oversight known as expenditure responsibility for those
donated funds . . . The contributions from the private foundation permit the
§ 501(c)(4) to use other contributions for lobbying and campaign intervention.”
Aprill, supra note 56, at 377 n.187. This same tactic could also be used by public
charities.
67. See Uri Friedman, Beyond Russia: 5 Ways to Interfere in U.S. Elections – With-
out Breaking the Law, ATLANTIC (July 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/inter-
national/archive/2017/07/legal-ways-interfere-election/534057/; see also Jon Schwarz
& Lee Fang, Cracks in the Dam: Three Paths Citizens United Created for Foreign
Money to Pour into U.S. Elections, INTERCEPT (Aug. 3, 2016, 1:12 PM), https://
theintercept.com/2016/08/03/citizens-united-foreign-money-us-elections/ (noting that
in theory, § 501(c)(4) organizations have to keep any foreign money segregated and
only spend funds from American donors on U.S. elections).
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 85 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 85 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\21-2\NYL205.txt unknown Seq: 19 27-MAR-19 15:08
2018] ENDING THE PLAGUE OF INCONSISTENCY 499
gress’s charge to the IRS to enforce the inconsistency (and also to do
nothing about it).
In short, the fact of inconsistent federal law on the treatment of
political activity means that issues of anonymous political speech,
weak and hard-to-enforce exemption standards, questions about defin-
ing political activity, disrespect for the rule of law, and damage to the
reputation of the IRS will be a core part of the legal landscape in
which all nonprofits operate. The unfortunate state of the status quo
should prompt change. The next Part of the Article examines possible
solutions.
III.
SOLUTIONS: CONSISTENT RULES AND FEWER LIMITS
There are several goals in crafting solutions. One goal is to pro-
vide for consistent treatment of political campaign activity, absent a
compelling reason for inconsistent treatment. Consistent treatment
will reduce incentives to plan and strategize around tax classifications,
resulting in more honesty and easier administration.
Another goal is to choose solutions that reduce the role of the
IRS in regulating political activity. It is in the public interest for the
tax agency to be charged with the objective administration and en-
forcement of the revenue laws. It is not in the public interest for the
IRS to be in a position of making nuanced and facts-and-circum-
stances determinations that open the agency to charges of partisanship,
absent a significant revenue-related purpose.
A final goal is to advance the most appropriate tax treatment of
social welfare and political organizations to account for the new types
of speech allowed by Citizens United.68
A. Consistent Disclosure and Tax Treatment
A critical part of any solution is for Congress69 to make consis-
tent70 the disclosure and tax treatment of social welfare and political
68. As noted at the outset, this Article focuses on social welfare organizations.
However, the general approaches discussed here also pertain to other noncharitable
exempt organizations like labor unions and trade associations.
69. Although arguably some changes could be achieved through administrative ac-
tion, see Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick
Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 438 (2011) (advocating
before the IRS controversy that the IRS make changes to the disclosure rules on social
welfare organizations), legislation is preferable after the recent scandals, Donald B.
Tobin, The 2013 IRS Crisis: Where Do We Go from Here?, 142 TAX NOTES 1120
(2014) [hereinafter 2013 IRS Crisis].
70. The issue for tax law is consistent treatment across exemption categories—so
that the same type of activity is disclosed (or not) regardless of tax classification.
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organizations. The self-evident value of consistency is that, with con-
sistent rules, there would be no reason to pick a tax classification to
gain a disclosure or financing advantage, thereby greatly reducing the
occasions and incentive for abuse and opportunism, with all their re-
sulting harms. This is (or should be) common-sense policymaking.71
Further, consistent rules in this area fit with past congressional legisla-
tion, which has followed a pattern of loophole closure, both with re-
spect to the taxation of investment income,72 and disclosure.73
1. Disclosure
Political consensus aside, imposing disclosure rules on social
welfare organizations is not without difficulties. In the political organ-
ization context, disclosure of contributors is a generally effective
means to identify the source of financing because political activity is,
for all intents and purposes, the sole activity of a political organiza-
tion. Applying disclosure rules to an organization that primarily en-
gages in nonpolitical activity is not as neat.
One problem is that disclosing all donor names does not directly
reveal the source of political funds. Because money is fungible, there
is no way of knowing which of the disclosed donors funded the politi-
cal activity. Further, donors can frustrate the value of disclosure by
first donating to a shell § 501(c)(4) (or other) organization that in turn
donates to the § 501(c)(4) organization that spends the money for po-
litical purposes. Disclosure by the latter § 501(c)(4) organization of
the grant from the shell organization would not be very informative.74
Whether to require disclosure (or not) is more a question of campaign finance law and
less important for tax purposes than that there be consistency.
71. That said, it would be naive not to recognize that common sense is often in
short supply, and in this case may be resisted by those who want to preserve avenues
for anonymous political speech, are not bothered by harms to the IRS or the tax sys-
tem and have no objection to facilitating tax benefits to political donors.
72. The inclusion of a tax on the investment income of noncharitable exempt orga-
nizations when Congress codified the tax treatment of political organizations in 1975
was intended to preserve consistent tax treatment across the exemption categories. As
explained by the legislative history, social welfare organizations should be treated “on
an equal basis for tax purposes with political organizations.” S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at
7505 (1974).
73. The addition of disclosure rules as a condition of political organization status in
the year 2000 was intended to close the “stealth PAC” loophole and provide for con-
sistent disclosure rules.
74. The § 527 disclosure regime can be circumvented in a similar way: a donor first
transfers funds to a social welfare organization, which then transfers the money to the
§ 527 organization. Although the § 527 organization discloses the § 501(c)(4) source,
absent disclosure by the § 501(c)(4) organization, there is no way to know the original
source. Requiring disclosure by § 501(c)(4) organizations would help curb this abuse.
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In addition, disclosing all donor names is to over-disclose and com-
promise the privacy of donors that make contributions to fund
nonpolitical activities.75
Some of these concerns might not materialize, however. For ex-
ample, one approach would be to require disclosure of all donors to
social welfare organizations that engage in political activity, as it is
defined for political organizations under § 527.76 Donations under
$200 would not have to be disclosed.77 Under this rule, social welfare
organizations could avoid disclosure in two ways: (1) by refraining
from political activity, or (2) by conducting all political activity out of
a separate segregated fund.78 The result would be to encourage social
welfare organizations to conduct any political activity from a separate
segregated fund that was funded solely by outside contributions.79 In
other words, the organization would have a choice: protect against
over-disclosure by segregating the funding and conduct of political
activity or conduct the activity directly and face the wrath of donors of
the social welfare activities.80 Faced with such a choice, many social
welfare organizations would segregate their activities.
Admittedly, this approach requires a fairly clear understanding of
the type of conduct that must be disclosed. Further, it would be a trap
for an unwary social welfare organization that inadvertently conducts
political activity and as a result has to disclose all donors for the year.
Accordingly, exceptions for de minimis political activities and for
small social welfare organizations might be appropriate.
From a tax perspective, the ideal scenario would be to place the
obligation to enforce disclosure in the hands of the FEC, for both so-
Suffice it to say, however, that a donor determined to remain anonymous can probably
find a way.
75. See Terence Dougherty, Section 501(c)(4) Organizations: Political Candidate-
Related and Other Partisan Activities in Furtherance of the Social Welfare, 36 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 1337, 1410-11 (2013) (expressing the concern that requiring disclo-
sure of all donors might harm their ability to get new members).
76. This is the definition of “exempt function.”
77. The $200 amount tracks the disclosure threshold for political organizations. The
amount is measured by aggregating all contributions of a single donor.
78. Separate segregated funds are treated like political organizations and subject to
disclosure rules. I.R.C. § 527(f)(3) (2012).
79. If the organization funds the segregated fund with general treasury monies of
the § 501(c)(4), that would trigger disclosure of all § 501(c)(4) donors.
80. Another option would be disclosure of all donors to the social welfare organiza-
tion making contributions (in the aggregate) above a certain threshold amount, e.g.,
$25,000. This would help to minimize over-disclosure. Although some political activ-
ity would go undisclosed, the privacy of small donors (which may or may not make
up the bulk of the social welfare activity) would be protected. See generally Tobin,
Quick Repair, supra note 70 (suggesting a threshold of $25,000).
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cial welfare and political organizations.81 Monitoring campaign
speech is a damaging distraction for the IRS as recent events have
shown.82 Most importantly though, notwithstanding imperfections that
a disclosure regime for social welfare organizations would entail, as
discussed in Part II of this Article, the costs of not acting, and of pre-
serving the status quo, are higher.
2. Taxation of Donors
Less significant than disclosure, but still important, is securing
consistent tax treatment of donors. As noted, under current law, do-
nors of appreciated property to a political organization must pay tax
on the capital gain.83 By contrast, donors of appreciated property to a
social welfare organization do not pay such a tax. The result is that
politically motivated donors with appreciated property to contribute
have a reason to fund a social welfare organization instead of a politi-
cal organization in order to avoid income tax.
Congress imposed the tax on donations of appreciated property to
political organizations in order to “prevent[ ] avoidance of tax by indi-
viduals by taxing them on any unrealized appreciation attributable to
their contributions.”84 Absent a tax on the donor, the political organi-
zation would bear the tax burden upon sale and realization of invest-
ment income. Thus, the concern at the time85 was over whether the
donor or the political organization should bear the tax burden, and not
that the unrealized appreciation would go untaxed.
The issue today is of greater concern. As discussed, the inconsis-
tent treatment creates an incentive to use social welfare organizations
for political purposes, which was not an issue in 1975 when the rule
was enacted. Further, as a tax policy matter, because of the broader
exemption for social welfare organizations, tax on appreciation may
81. See Mayer, supra note 38, at 682 (arguing that the FEC and not the IRS should
be the institution of choice for monitoring disclosure); see also Tobin, 2013 IRS Cri-
sis, supra note 69, at 1129 (concluding that Congress should “pass broad-based legis- R
lation requiring disclosure of campaign-related activity and remove the Service as a
campaign finance regulatory agency”). The DISCLOSE Act, introduced in Congress
after Citizens United, is an example of such an approach. H.R. 148, 113th Cong.
(2013); S. 229, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 1134, 115th Cong. (2017). In general, it
amends the Federal Election Campaign Act, not the Internal Revenue Code, to require
disclosure of independent expenditures.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
83. I.R.C. § 84.
84. S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7481 (1974).
85. Prior to Congress’s enactment of § 84, the IRS determined that the political
organization should pay tax on the gain. Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14, and Rev.
Rul. 74-23, 1974-1 C.B. 17.
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be avoided entirely.86 This runs contrary to the congressional policy of
taxing investment income with respect to political activity and to the
view that transfers of appreciated property for political purposes are
not gifts87 and therefore gain should be realized upon transfer.
The solution is to extend the income tax on unrealized apprecia-
tion to donors making contributions to social welfare organizations.88
The tax could be limited only to social welfare organizations that en-
gage in political activity (within several years of the contribution).
Broader reform, though, would extend the tax to contributions of ap-
preciated property to all noncharitable exempt organizations. The rea-
soning would be that such contributions are not gifts (for income or
gift tax purposes) and thus the transfer should be a realization event.
3. Remaining Issues
Consistent disclosure and financing rules would, at a minimum,
greatly reduce incentives to abuse the social welfare organization form
for political purposes. Consistent rules would relieve some of the pres-
sure on the “primarily” test and on the IRS. Groups with mainly politi-
cal intentions, without disclosure or financing benefits to organizing
as social welfare organizations, would in all likelihood prefer political
organization status to avoid facing limits on political activity, however
opaque those limits may be.
That said, however, a broader issue remains, namely whether and
how to limit the political activity of social welfare organizations. As a
practical matter, so long as the primary activities test is the basis for
86. The potential for tax avoidance is straightforward. A donor with highly appreci-
ated stock donates to a social welfare organization in Year 1. Assuming the donation
is a gift, no income tax applies on the unrealized appreciation at the time of the dona-
tion. I.R.C. § 102. Also in Year 1, the social welfare organization sells the stock, and
does not pay income tax on the proceeds because of income tax exemption. The social
welfare organization refrains from political activity in Year 1 in order to avoid impo-
sition of the § 527(f) tax on investment income. (Thus, careful timing of political
activity is involved, which makes the tax avoidance harder (assuming that the § 527(f)
tax applies).) In Year 2, however, the social welfare organization uses the proceeds
from the stock sale to fund political activity. Because there is no investment income in
Year 2, no § 527(f) tax is owed. In this way, appreciated property may be contributed
without triggering income tax on the appreciation either to the donor or to the
organization.
87. By making the “transfer” of appreciated property to a political organization a
realization event, Congress stated its belief that transfers of property for political pur-
poses were not gifts, and therefore that the transfer was a realization event. S. REP.
NO. 93-1357, at 7481 (1975) (stating that “campaign contributions in reality are not a
gift, but rather constitute contributions to further the general political or good-govern-
ment objectives of the donor”).
88. See Polsky & Charles, supra note 32, at 1013 n.81 (encouraging realization for
appreciated property gifts to noncharitable exempts in the absence of gift tax).
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limiting political activity, there will be questions and concerns about
crossing the line, especially by established social welfare groups that
have a strong base of nonpolitical activity (e.g., AARP, NRA, Planned
Parenthood, Sierra Club, etc.). In other words, consistent rules will not
vanquish the question of how much is too much. Further, as a matter
of tax policy, there is a valid question whether any limit on political
activity makes sense or is constitutional, especially after the Citizens
United decision. In addition, in the event that Congress (or the IRS)
does not create consistent rules in this area, other ways to approach the
problems of the status quo should be considered.
B. Reforming Political Activity Limits
The issue is how much political activity by social welfare organi-
zations should be allowed consistent with the tax status. As discussed
earlier, Treasury regulations and IRS guidance together require that
“the organization’s primary activities [must] promote social wel-
fare.”89 A leading complaint is that the standard is uncertain in appli-
cation both qualitatively and quantitatively. A related complaint is that
the standard is too permissive a deviation from the statutory mandate
of “exclusive” social welfare activity.90 What should be done? Where
89. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
90. The “primarily” test of the regulations has been criticized as agency overreach
and an improper interpretation of congressional intent. See Press Release, Democracy
21, Rep. Van Hollen and Watchdog Groups File Lawsuit Challenging Flawed IRS
Regulations (Aug. 21, 2013), https://perma.cc/3Z4Z-YZCG. “Exclusively” as “prima-
rily,” however has a long history. In the § 501(c)(3) context, the Supreme Court found
in 1945 that an insubstantial nonexempt purpose, and therefore some nonexempt ac-
tivities, was consistent with tax exemption under an “exclusively” standard. Better
Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (holding that
“the presence of a single [nonexempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy
the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes”).
The Treasury regulations for § 501(c)(3) subsequently adopted a nonliteral construc-
tion, providing that “exclusively” means primarily. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)
(as amended in 2008) (providing that “[a]n organization will be regarded as ‘operated
exclusively’ for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities
which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes”). This is the standard gener-
ally adopted in the § 501(c)(4) regulations in 1959. Congress also embraced a nonlit-
eral understanding of the term “exclusively” when it passed the unrelated business
income tax in 1950, Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301, 64 Stat. 906, 947 (codified
as amended in I.R.C. § 511), which became applicable to social welfare organizations
in 1969, Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(a)(2), 83 Stat. 487, 536
(codified as amended in I.R.C. § 511). As to what “primarily” means, and whether it
has the same meaning for § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4), are legitimate questions. But
agency overreach is not the issue. For an excellent discussion of the evolution and
meaning of the standard, see Galston, supra note 27.
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and how to draw the line?91
1. A Percentage-Based Test
One approach would be to define a “primarily” threshold for so-
cial welfare organizations using a mechanical bright-line. A model
would be the regulations in the § 501(c)(3) area that articulate in great
detail the permitted amount of lobbying.92 For example, regulations
could specify the exact amount of expenditures allowed for political
activity in relation to overall expenses,93 place caps on the amount of
time spent by the organization, and attempt also to measure the impact
of endorsements and other activities that may have a high impact but
low expense (i.e., “cheap speech”). Some working definition of politi-
cal activity also would have to be adopted.
One threshold issue with such an approach is deciding where to
draw the line. Should the line be at forty-nine percent, thirty-three
percent, twenty-five percent, or ten percent or less? What level of po-
litical activity is consistent with social welfare organization status? A
forty-nine percent line seems the least arbitrary, based as it is on
majoritarian logic. That is, if more than half of an organization’s activ-
ities are not related to exempt purposes, then it makes sense to con-
clude that the organization is not mostly organized for exempt
purposes. Perhaps second-best is a ten percent or less test, which some
would argue comes closer to Congress’s original intent in using the
term “exclusively” for social welfare in the statute and seems to ad-
vance a policy that political activity by social welfare organizations
should be severely constrained.
If the line is drawn at less than forty-nine percent, however, an
additional issue arises, namely, the creation of a gap between failed
social welfare organizations and political organizations. For example,
if the threshold were, say, that no more than twenty-five percent of
activities could be political, what would happen to organizations that
91. The primary activities test of present law could be changed legislatively or ad-
ministratively, in most cases, with similar results.
92. Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-1 to -10 (1990). The organization can elect into this reg-
ulatory regime or instead be subject to a “substantially all” facts and circumstances
test. I.R.C. § 501(h).
93. There are multiple proposals. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Section 527 Obsta-
cle to Meaningful Section 501(c)(4) Regulation, 13 PITT. TAX REV. 43, 75 (2015)
(noting a preference for a limit “well below 40%”); see American Bar Association
Section of Taxation, Comments on Proposed Regulations Regarding Guidance for
Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities
(May 7, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/taxation/
policy/050714comments.authcheckdam.pdf (suggesting an amount “somewhere be-
tween insubstantial (but not zero) and 40%”).
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exceeded the threshold, but did not engage in enough political activity
to qualify as a political organization? Presumably, such organizations
would lose social welfare organization status and become fully taxable
nonprofits. It would be an odd system though, not to mention irra-
tional and perhaps unconstitutional, to treat those organizations worse
than political organizations from a tax perspective because they en-
gage in less political activity.94 Furthermore, the administrative bur-
den on the IRS would increase because of the addition of yet another
line to police—that between the social welfare organization, the taxa-
ble nonprofit, and the political organization.
Another issue is that any percentage-based limit would have to
account in some fashion for non-political, non-social welfare activity.
Under current law, there is no separate sublimit on political activity as
an unrelated activity, i.e., the forty-nine percent “rule of thumb” ap-
plies to all nonrelated activity. For example, if a forty-nine percent
limit is chosen as the bright line, it could apply: (1) to all non-social
welfare activity, with the organization free to choose the balance of
political and non-political unrelated activity, or (2) with a separate
sublimit on political activity, i.e., a forty-nine percent limit of which
no more than X percent may be political activity. Yet, if a distinct
sublimit just for political activity were imposed, doing so brings the
issue back to the question of arbitrariness. Why single out one nonex-
empt activity for a separate cap and (presumably) a distinct mechani-
cal test? Why should political activity be capped at, say, twenty-five
percent but unrelated trade or business activity could go up to forty-
nine percent of total activity?
In short, the promise of greater certainty and perhaps compliance
under a percentage-based approach (even assuming workable rules
could be devised) must be balanced by recognition that a detailed reg-
ulatory regime to assess the primarily threshold would require a num-
ber of arbitrary decisions, and perhaps more importantly, imply a
much more robust enforcement presence by the IRS, including a need
for additional resources. Thus, though superficially appealing, a per-
centage-based approach would increase administrative burdens on the
94. In this regard, note that for a taxable organization, no deduction is allowed for
campaign activity, making the loss of exemption that much more punitive. I.R.C.
§ 162(e). For additional discussion of taxation of taxable nonprofit political organiza-
tions, see Roger Colinvaux, Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption: A Gordian’s
Knot, 34 VA. TAX REV. 1, 54-58 (2014) (discussing whether § 527 treatment is volun-
tary or mandatory and the need for a new tax baseline); Donald B. Tobin, Will Taxa-
ble Entities Be the New Stealth Dark Money Campaign Organizations?, 49 VAL. U. L.
REV. 583 (2015). For additional discussion of the “gap,” see Aprill, supra note 93, at
73-74.
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IRS and have the perhaps perverse effect of involving the IRS more
deeply—not less—in political activity questions.95
2. Allow Unlimited Political Campaign Activity
Another option, which might seem radical at first, is to eliminate
the definitional limit on political campaign activity, i.e., permit unlim-
ited political activity that relates to the social welfare purpose of the
organization. This would require revisiting the regulations, which
have provided since 1959 that “[t]he promotion of social welfare does
not include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political
campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public
office.”96 Relevant here, the regulation has been extended to apply to
other noncharitable exempt organizations such as § 501(c)(5) labor
unions and § 501(c)(6) trade associations.97
Though longstanding, the rationale for the regulation is uncer-
tain,98 and on its face seems absurd. A social welfare lobby group, a
labor union, and a trade association all plainly have political aspects
that are directly connected to their exempt purposes. For a social wel-
fare lobby organization that promotes gun rights to advocate for a can-
didate in favor of gun control makes sense. For a labor union to favor
a pro-union political candidate over another undoubtedly would serve
labor purposes. For a trade association that promotes a particular in-
dustry, preferring the business candidate over the consumer advocate
would seem to be in direct furtherance of its exempt purpose. Further,
each type of organization may and does establish separate political
organizations—convincing evidence that pursuing political activity
furthers underlying organizational purposes. The law makes nonsense
95. Notably, in its proposed regulations on § 501(c)(4) political activity, the IRS
declined to provide guidance on the question of what constitutes “primarily.” Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,537-38 (Nov. 29, 2013). For a
summary of the Proposed Regulations, see Aprill, supra note 93, at 49-54.
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990). The proposed regu-
lations would have modified this part of the regulations, replacing the current use of
the § 501(c)(3) standard for political activity with a new definition of political activ-
ity, distinct for § 501(c)(4). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535,
71,537 (Nov. 29, 2013).
97. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969), 1969 WL 20405 (providing
that § 501(c)(5) and § 501(c)(6) organizations face similar constraints as § 501(c)(4)
organizations).
98. See Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and
Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt
Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 73 n. 83 (2004); see also Aprill, supra
note 93, at 71 (noting that the proposed regulations in 1956 made no mention of R
political activity).
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of reality by defining political activity as incompatible with nonchari-
table exempt purposes. Is there a good reason?
One (after-the-fact) explanation is a private benefit rationale, i.e.,
that political campaign activity, unlike lobbying, ultimately serves the
private ends of a candidate whose personal mission and benefit may
be far removed from the purposes of a social welfare organization.
Thus, the IRS has reasoned in the context of § 501(c)(5) and
§ 501(c)(6) organizations that “support of a candidate for public office
necessarily involves the organization in the total political attitudes and
positions of the candidate.”99 But this conclusion is debatable. Support
for a political candidate need not mean reverence or identity. Further,
it is not clear why the fact that a candidate has positions on multiple
issues means that support for the candidate by definition cannot also
advance the organization’s mission.
Another argument is that restrictions on campaign activity are
necessary to protect against capture of the organization and conse-
quent corruption of its purposes.100 It has long been observed that non-
profit organizations are prone to capture because of weak oversight.101
Without shareholders, nonprofit organizations are more open to direc-
tion by managers who might abuse the organization by taking it in
personal, private directions.
Although capture is a legitimate concern, fear of capture has
more force when directed to charitable organizations, which are
formed in the public interest, than to noncharitable nonprofits, which
tolerate a great deal more “private” interest.102 In addition, many ex-
99. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233, 1969 WL 20405 (Dec. 30, 1969); see also
Am. Campaign Academy v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1055-57, 1070-73, 1079 (1989)
(ruling that an organization that ran an educational program that trained campaign
workers did not qualify under § 501(c)(3) because of impermissible private benefit to
Republican candidates and entities). Others share this view. See Dougherty, supra
note 75, at 1394 (arguing that supporting a candidate’s campaign “can be considered
supportive of the private interests of that candidate” because it “directly benefits that
candidate economically” and helps “a private constituency”). Miriam Galston argues
that the assumption of the regulations that political activity does not further social
welfare is “debatable” in cases of a single-issue candidate, but stronger when political
candidates take positions on issues outside the scope of an organization’s mission.
Galston, supra note 27, at 170.
100. Brain Galle & Donald Tobin, Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Stud-
ies, Comments on Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candi-
date-Related Political Activities 6–8 (Feb. 22, 2014); see also Aprill, supra note 93, at
70 (“Engaging in political campaign intervention will inevitably involve issues not
related to such organizations’ exempt purposes.”).
101. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 497, 506–07 (1981).
102. See e.g., FRANCES R. HILL AND DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, ¶ 13.01, at 13-2–13-5 (2002) (noting that the “only reason for having
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isting social welfare organizations already engage in considerable
amounts of political activity, which is another way of saying that cap-
ture concerns already exist under present law. Although removing the
definitional limits might make capture worse, it is questionable
whether any increased risk of capture to a social welfare organization
is sufficient to justify arbitrary limits on a core activity.103
Most likely, the reason for the regulation is rooted in the parallel
relationship between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4). Because the “pro-
motion of social welfare” is a charitable purpose under the § 501(c)(3)
regulations,104 and § 501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from en-
gaging in political activity, it is an easy (if facile) conclusion that po-
litical activity by definition does not further social welfare for
purposes of § 501(c)(4). If the Treasury Department made this conclu-
sion, however, it was probably reluctant to prohibit campaign activity
in the § 501(c)(4) regulations outright because of concern that doing
so would be inconsistent with the statute.105 On the other hand, for the
Treasury Department to acknowledge that campaign activity could
further social welfare would be to introduce a difficult inquiry into
whether the political activity was “related” or “unrelated.”106 Whether
two separate types of exempt organizations was that the Section 501(c)(4) self-help
model appeared to present private benefit issues that might prove troublesome under
Section 501(c)(3)”); John Francis Reilly, Carter C., Hull, and Barbara A. Braig Allen,
IRC 501(c)(4) Organizations, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS; TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 at I-1 (2004), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopici03.pdf (noting that § 501(c)(4) “comprehends a very broad category of orga-
nizations”); 1981 CPE Text, Chapter G, “Social Welfare: What Does It Mean? How
Much Private Benefit Is Permissible? available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopicg81.pdf (noting that § 501(c)(4) is “a haven for organizations that lack the
accepted essential characteristics of a taxable entity, but elude classification under
other subparagraphs of § 501(c)”). The exemption for § 501(c)(4) has long been be-
lieved to have been secured by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW
OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANI-
ZATIONS 29 (Joint Comm. Print 2005).
103. Besides, the risk of capture on a systemic scale seems overblown. Some organi-
zation managers might be swayed to endorse or promote a candidate against the or-
ganization’s interests. To the extent this occurs repeatedly, other doctrines of tax law
could be used (such as private benefit) to revoke an organization’s exempt status.
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2017).
105. The presence of an express prohibition on campaign intervention in § 501(c)(3)
and the absence of one in § 501(c)(4) raises a strong negative inference that no prohi-
bition was intended for § 501(c)(4) organizations.
106. In 1959 the Treasury was dealing with just such a “related-unrelated” inquiry in
the context of a trade or business. Trade or business activity is allowed without limit,
so long as it is “related” to the exempt purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (as
amended in 2017); see Thomas A. Troyer, Quantity of Unrelated Business Consistent
with Charitable Exemption – Some Clarification, 56 TAX NOTES 1075, 1076 (1992).
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 90 Side B      03/27/2019   15:29:06
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 90 Side B      03/27/2019   15:29:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\21-2\NYL205.txt unknown Seq: 30 27-MAR-19 15:08
510 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21:481
for those reasons or not, the regulations struck a compromise. By de-
claring that political activity does not further social welfare purposes,
the regulations avoid a “related-unrelated” inquiry but achieve a limi-
tation, set by the “primarily” test.
Yet a conclusion that political activity does not further exempt
purposes under § 501(c)(3) reflects, or should reflect, different con-
cerns than a conclusion that political activity does not further social
welfare organization purposes, especially after the Citizens United de-
cision. In the § 501(c)(3) context, the corrupting influence on the or-
ganization, fears of private benefit, and the risk of capture make
campaign intervention uniquely ripe for a prohibition. Prohibition
serves the no-subsidy norm, is tied inextricably to the charitable de-
duction,107 and is critical to protect the integrity of the charitable ex-
empt purpose.
In the context of social welfare organizations, however, these
same arguments are unconvincing. Limiting the campaign intervention
of social welfare organizations does not serve the no-subsidy norm.
Not only are contributions to social welfare organizations not deducti-
ble as charitable contributions,108 but to engage in campaign interven-
tion is to trigger loss of exemption with respect to the political
activity.109 In addition, social welfare organizations plainly are not
“public benefit” organizations in the same way as a charity.110 The
§ 501(c)(4) organization is allowed to engage in unlimited lobbying
(as are the § 501(c)(5) and § 501(c)(6) organizations) and some politi-
cal activity, and is considered a “catchall” exemption category for
groups that fail to fit elsewhere.111 Thus, § 501(c)(4) is a useful classi-
fication for nonprofit lobby groups and local civic organizations that
107. No charitable deduction is allowed to an organization that fails the political
activities prohibition. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2012). Other tax benefits are also related
to the § 501(c)(3) classification, such as tax-exempt financing. Id. § 145.
108. Veterans’ organizations, although technically a type of “social welfare organi-
zation,” are eligible to receive deductible contributions but are not subject to the polit-
ical activities prohibition. Id. § 501(c)(19). Veterans’ organizations therefore are hard
to categorize.
109. Id. § 527(f)(1).
110. The point is even stronger for labor unions and trade associations. Although
these groups are undoubtedly a positive force in civil society, they are not disinter-
ested public benefit organizations in the same sense as a § 501(c)(3) charity is in-
tended to be. Their purposes have manifest private or even political overtones.
Defining their purpose as exclusive of political activity for tax reasons seems churlish,
especially after the Supreme Court has allowed unlimited independent expenditures.
111. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGA-
NIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 768 (2d ed. 2006) (referring to § 501(c)(4) as a
“dumping ground”).
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serve a narrow class of beneficiaries. But the benefit served is less
noble and less directly in the public interest than that of a charity.
Nonetheless, even if the standard explanations for the regulation
do not appear justified, placing a limit on the political activity of so-
cial welfare organizations does allow for the distinction between the
social welfare organization and the political organization. In this way,
the limit can be said to protect the integrity of the social welfare or-
ganization purpose by making sure that the nonpolitical activity (or
purpose) remains “primary.”112 In other words, for convenience and
perhaps even transparency, an organization’s stated purpose—social
welfare, labor, pursuit of trade, politics—must remain the top purpose,
otherwise the tax classification changes. In short, one tax policy rea-
son to limit the political activity of social welfare organizations is to
provide appropriate labels of organizational types.
The labeling function of the political activity limit probably was
a sufficient reason before Citizens United removed the campaign fi-
nance law ban on corporate (and labor union) independent expendi-
tures.113 As a practical matter, the ban indirectly served as a
quantitative limit on political activity, simply because it limited the
type of speech a social welfare organization could engage in. In a way,
the tax law limits largely were superfluous.114 The pre-Citizens United
world of campaign finance thus fits fairly neatly into the tax law para-
digm of political activity limitations. The definitional limits were
helpful in a black-and-white world, where organizations either were
political, or not.
Now that unlimited independent corporate political activity is al-
lowed, the tax law definitional approach is outmoded. Social welfare
organization groups naturally will and should expect to be able to en-
gage in more political activity, much of which on any common under-
standing will be related to the organization’s purposes. The tax law
rules that deem political activity as definitionally inconsistent with so-
112. Notably, political organization treatment is based on whether the organization’s
“primary” purpose is to engage in political activity. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).
113. 52 U.S.C. § 30116; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010).
114. The issue advocacy loophole exploited by some political organizations to avoid
the Federal Election Campaign Act never really spread to the social welfare organiza-
tion, perhaps because of questions about application of the gift tax, the need to dilute
the activity to fit into the “loophole,” and general uncertainty about the contours of the
tax law political activity limits. As explained by Professor Polsky, before Citizens
United and after the 2000 changes, the main issue was with donors, unconcerned
about anonymity, who therefore preferred § 527 over § 501(c)(4) to be certain of
avoiding gift tax. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on Section 527
Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1782 (2007).
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cial welfare organization purposes and so subject to limitation thus
seem patently unsound.
Further, once some political activity is allowed by tax law, main-
taining a quantum-based limit in the wake of Citizens United seems
arbitrary, counterproductive, complex, and distracting—especially be-
cause the activity in truth will often be a related one.115 Indeed, defini-
tional limits on the activity puts a strain on the rule of law. It is like
allowing life but decreeing that breathing is not related to existing.116
All that said, from a purely tax perspective, whether or not there
are definitional political activity limits would not even matter much if
the labeling function of the exemption categories had no tax conse-
quences.117 Then, the political activity limits sensibly could be re-
tained and defended on the ground that the only tax consequence of
exceeding the limit was a change in tax classification, e.g., from
§ 501(c)(4) to § 527.118 The organization would have a new tax classi-
fication, perhaps one it does not prefer, but one that is intended to
reflect the reality of the organization’s operations.119
Under current law, however, there are potentially significant tax
differences between a social welfare organization and a political or-
ganization. Broadly, if a social welfare organization exceeds the politi-
cal activity limit and becomes a political organization, it would mean
a loss of exemption on the income from the social welfare organiza-
tion purpose.
The question then is what explains this result. Probably the best
explanation is rooted again in a history of organizations being either
115. If the stipulation that political activity does not further social welfare was re-
moved from the regulations, a distinction between “related” and “unrelated” political
activity would be introduced. This distinction exists for lobbying, or indeed any activ-
ity. The presumption, however, would be that political activity would further social
welfare organization purposes. For a discussion of the difficulty of maintaining a re-
lated-unrelated distinction in the context of political activity of charitable organiza-
tions, see Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens
United: A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 749-50 (2012).
116. This strain also exists in the context of a charity, but as noted, the other tax
benefits associated with the charity make the charity distinguishable.
117. As discussed below, there are significant consequences relating to disclosure
that hinge on tax classifications. Disclosure rules are not however primarily driven by
concerns of taxation, even though tax law is the vehicle.
118. This assumes that it is administratively feasible to switch tax classifications and
that there is some process in place for doing so.
119. Note that a shift from social welfare organization status to political organization
status should be less important to the organization than a shift from § 501(c)(3) status
to another exemption category. This is not only because loss of § 501(c)(3) status
entails loss of tax benefits other than tax exemption, but also because the § 501(c)(3)
category brings with it a certain identity, both for the organization and in the public
eye.
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political or not, with campaign finance rules preventing too much of a
gray area. The history of “political organizations” suggests that they
were just that—serving politics and nothing else—i.e., parties and po-
litical committees. The tax treatment followed the facts, with a bright
line exempting only political activity income.120 The unstated assump-
tion must have been either that political organizations would not en-
gage as a general matter in nonpolitical activity or, for simplicity, that
they should not be encouraged to do so. That assumption for a politi-
cal organization may still hold true. But now, the opposite problem
exists, and bona fide social welfare organizations seek to engage in
significant political activity.
In short, the loss of exemption on social welfare organization
purpose income for engaging in too much political activity has not
been tested. A genuine mixed social welfare-political purpose organi-
zation was not enough of a reality, and thus, crossovers from social
welfare to political status were not a concern for tax purposes. Now,
the facts of organization types have changed, and the issue is raised as
to whether the exempt status of the social welfare organization pur-
pose income should depend on the quantum of political activity.
In the wake of Citizens United, the answer is no. Ideally, there
should be no tax consequence to a social welfare organization for ex-
ceeding what amount to arbitrary limits on an important and generally
related activity. In other words, so far as the tax law is concerned, the
definitional limitations on the political activity of social welfare orga-
nizations should be eliminated.121
Getting rid of the definitional political activity limitations has
significant appeal. It would simplify tax administration, improve com-
pliance, and embrace free speech. That said, removal of the limits
should not be undertaken until the nontax advantages of social welfare
organization status (especially the nondisclosure of donors) have been
eliminated relative to the political organization. Put another way, after
Citizens United, the ultimate usefulness of the political activity defini-
tional limitations on social welfare organizations is not related to tax
policy, but rather is to distinguish between organizations that must
disclose donors and organizations that avoid disclosure. Were it not
for this function, and from a tax perspective, the rule that political
activity does not further social welfare organization purposes should
be extinguished.
120. I.R.C. § 527(c) (2012).
121. Technically, a limit on “unrelated” political activity would remain and would
help protect against capture concerns.
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 92 Side B      03/27/2019   15:29:06
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 92 Side B      03/27/2019   15:29:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\21-2\NYL205.txt unknown Seq: 34 27-MAR-19 15:08
514 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21:481
C. Additional Reform Possibilities
To this point, the argument is that there should be consistent dis-
closure and financing rules between social welfare and political orga-
nizations, and the political activity limits could then be eliminated as
not serving any compelling tax interest. This would be a significant
improvement over current law. Additional reforms, outlined below,
could also be considered.
1. Tax the Investment Income of Social Welfare Organizations
One reform is overbroad to the question of political activity, and
so technically outside the scope of this Article, but merits serious con-
sideration: to tax the investment income of social welfare organiza-
tions. In addition to eliminating a subsidy of questionable merit,122
assuming that the disclosure advantages of social welfare organiza-
tions are erased, taxing the investment income of § 501(c)(4) organi-
zations would virtually eliminate the significance of engaging in
political activity as a social welfare organization. It simply would not
matter from a tax perspective whether a social welfare organization
intervened in campaigns.123 The role of the IRS in regulating the polit-
ical activity of social welfare organizations would be extremely
limited.124
2. Expand the Exempt Status of Political Organizations
Another approach would be to expand the tax exemption for po-
litical organizations to include social welfare income. This might be a
good alternative to dispensing with the political activity limits on so-
122. For discussion, see Daniel Halperin, The Tax Exemption Under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4), 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 528 (2018) (arguing that con-
sumer mutual nonprofits should be taxed on investment income and that “it is trouble-
some to allow full exemption to an organization that may spend just short of half its
resources on social activities”); Aprill, supra note 56. The investment income of so-
cial welfare organizations should be pursued on the merits, not as a response to the
problem of political activity of social welfare organizations. As noted supra, Part II,
of the roughly 80,000 social welfare organizations, most do not engage in political
activity. That said, however, taxing the investment income of mutual nonprofits gen-
erally could yield a significant simplification of the taxation of noncharitable exempts.
See also David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their
Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451, 452 (2014) (suggesting that a § 501(c)(4) organization
that “engages in a significant amount of lobbying or campaigning would be taxable on
all of its investment income”).
123. The § 527(f) tax could be eliminated.
124. The IRS would still have to enforce the proxy tax, or the rule that social welfare
organizations that engage in political or lobbying activity either inform members that
a portion of their dues are not deductible or pay a tax.
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cial welfare organizations, especially in the absence of uniform disclo-
sure rules. The result would be to eliminate the tax penalty if a social
welfare organization exceeded the “primarily” test (however the test is
formulated). Instead of losing exemption, the organization could in-
stead be reclassified as a political organization with no tax cost to the
organization.
This should also make it much easier as a practical matter for the
IRS to reclassify organizations as political. Because the only real con-
sequence to reclassification would be disclosure (not loss of exemp-
tion), it should be harder to attack the IRS politically for having the
temerity to suggest that an organization with a substantial level of po-
litical activity should be shifted to political organization status. Relat-
edly, such a regime would also make a political activity limit more
coherent. For example, if Congress or the IRS took the position that
social welfare organizations should engage in only de minimis politi-
cal activity, any organization with substantial political activity would
be reclassified as a political organization, forcing disclosure, but
again, at no tax cost.
3. Tax Social Welfare Organization Political Expenditures
Another approach is worth mentioning, namely taxation of politi-
cal campaign activity by social welfare organizations. The idea would
be to treat social welfare organizations for tax purposes as the mirror
of political organizations. All expenditures for campaign activity
would be taxed at corporate rates, i.e., as “nonexempt function in-
come.” The tax could be avoided by conducting the activity through a
separate segregated fund, which would be treated as a political organi-
zation.125 The benefit to this approach would be to create strong tax
incentives to conduct campaign activity through a separate fund. It
would therefore be an alternative to having to legislate disclosure rules
for the campaign speech of social welfare organizations. This is be-
cause the tax detriment of conducting campaign activity directly
would likely overwhelm the disclosure advantage to doing so.
The downsides to this approach are that the IRS would have to
enforce the tax rigorously and without reservation.126 This would in-
125. This would be largely equivalent to making the tax under § 527(f) a tax on
political expenditures and eliminating the “lesser of” feature (and so the reference to
investment income).
126. The IRS has reserved for the future how to tax large swathes of expenditures
pursuant to § 527(f). Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(2), (3) (1980) (reserving treatment of
political expenditures allowed under FECA or similar state statute and indirect politi-
cal expenditures). For extensive discussion and recommendations on this issue, see
Nancy E. McGlamery & Rosemary E. Fei, Taxation with Reservations: Taxing Non-
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volve the IRS more deeply in regulating political activity and open the
door to constant pressure on the agency as being in the business of
taxing the exercise of First Amendment rights. Further, clear lines
about the type of activity that would trigger the tax would have to be
drawn. Otherwise, the tax could be open to challenge on vagueness
grounds. Relatedly, as a tax on speech, there inevitably would be other
constitutional challenges. Although the tax could easily be avoided
through an alternate channel, the Supreme Court in Citizens United
placed emphasis on the (perceived) burden of setting up a separate
segregated fund as a constitutional remedy.127
4. Enforce the No-Subsidy Norm
A final issue relates to maintaining the no-subsidy norm with re-
spect to § 501(c)(3) organizations. Transfers from § 501(c)(3) organi-
zations to social welfare organizations are allowed so long as the
funds are used for social welfare purposes. Already under present law
there are reasons to be concerned that, money being fungible, tax de-
ductible dollars are flowing through § 501(c)(3) organizations to
§ 501(c)(4) organizations for political purposes or to § 527 organiza-
tions. This threatens the integrity of the charitable deduction and char-
itable exempt purposes. The temptation to launder money through a
§ 501(c)(3) would be even greater if political activity limits are lifted
for social welfare groups.
One way to protect the no-subsidy norm would be to impose a
proxy tax on § 501(c)(3) organizations that would apply to the extent
of grants to a social welfare organization that engages in political ac-
tivity. A proxy tax would not prevent the establishment of exempt
organization networks but would help to ensure that funding for social
welfare organizations that engage in campaign activity and that are
affiliated with a § 501(c)(3) organization occurs with nondeductible
dollars. As an alternative, Congress could extend the taxable expendi-
ture concept that applies to private foundations to include grants by
public charities to social welfare organizations that engage in political
activity.
profit Political Expenditures After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 449, 449 (2011)
(noting that “[a]fter Citizens United, what is ‘allowable’ [under the FECA] has
mushroomed”).
127. 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010). (“PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expen-
sive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.”).
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 94 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
41065-nyl_21-2 Sheet No. 94 Side A      03/27/2019   15:29:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\21-2\NYL205.txt unknown Seq: 37 27-MAR-19 15:08
2018] ENDING THE PLAGUE OF INCONSISTENCY 517
CONCLUSION
The inconsistency of treatment between social welfare and politi-
cal organizations is like a cancer slowly metastasizing through the ex-
empt organization system. It undermines the rule of law, the
effectiveness of the IRS, and public faith in a system of rational rules,
objectively applied. The remedy requires only the political will to
make the rules consistent. Consistent rules would reduce, if not elimi-
nate, incentives to lie about the nature of an organization’s purpose or
communications with the public. Consistent rules also could lead to a
change in the law that eliminates restrictions on the free speech of
social welfare organizations. Congress should act.
